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Failure to discharge.  A discussion of the insufficient legal 







University Legal Aid Clinics are often confronted with aspects of the law which are 
quite alien to those faced by our colleagues in private practice.  One such area is 
that of assisting judgment debtors who have fallen afoul of disreputable and often 
immoral money lenders and other judgment creditors.  These creditors unilaterally 
charge exuberant and unlawful fees for interest and ‘legal’ costs, which amounts are 
simply added to the judgments ex post facto.  The issue of discharge then becomes 
hugely problematic as the courts do not mero motu step in to cancel emoluments 
attachment orders and other tools of collection employed by these creditors.  It is 
argued that the South African legal system, including legislation in this regard, lends 







Gebrek aan ontslag.  ‘n Bespreking van die onvoldoende regsmiddele 
beskikbaar aan vonnisskuldenaars binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks. 
 
Universiteit regshulpklinieke word dikwels blootgestel aan aspekte van die reg 
waarmee ons kollegas in die privaat praktyk nie gekonfronteer word nie.  Een van 
hierdie areas is die bystand wat verleen moet word aan vonnisskuldenaars wat 
ingeloop word deur ongure en immorele gelduitleners en ander skuldeisers.  Hierdie 
skuldeisers hef eensydiglik kwistige en onwettige fooie vir rente en ‘regskoste’, welke 
bedrae eenvoudig ex post facto by die vonnis gevoeg word.  Die kwessie van 
ontslag raak dan uiters problematies aangesien die howe nie mero motu intree om 
besoldigingsbeslagbevele en ander invorderings metodes van die skuldeisers te 
kanselleer nie.  Dit word geargumenteer dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regsisteem en 
wetgewing wat hiervoor voorsien, onvoldoende beskerming en regsmiddele bied aan 
armlastige regshulpbehoewende kliënte wat voor hierdie situasie te staan kom.   
 
                                            
 Practicing Attorney and Notary Public of the High Court of South Africa, Lecturer in Civil Procedure, 
Legal Skills and Practical Legal Training at the Legal Aid Clinic, University of Stellenbosch. 
 This article emanates from a conference paper delivered at the 5th International Journal of Clinical 
Legal Education Conference, held at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg on 9 to 






University legal aid clinics are often confronted with aspects or sides of the law which 
are quite alien to those faced by our colleagues in private practice.  The same can 
also be said for any institution which renders legal aid exclusively to the indigent.  It 
is not uncommon to find that these organisations specialise in areas of law such as 
assisting refugees,1 enforcing social security for the unemployed,2 representing 
dismissed employees3 and opposing unlawful evictions of farm labourers and 
squatters.4  Private law firms will in general seldom get involved in these so called 
“poverty law” cases as a result of the inability of these clients to pay their fees.5  
 
It is also more often than not the case that these clinics and institutions rely on 
sponsorships for their existence, and that they thus have limited means, in terms of 
finances and human resources, at their disposal.6  This is in stark contrast to the 
deep pockets belonging to huge private commercial law firms and their clients.  It 
can be argued that in a capitalistic driven society even in the legal system money 
talks – when it doesn’t shout it at least whispers! 
 
It can also be argued that because of the vast resources available to invest in the 
law protecting the interests of those fortunate enough to be able to afford such help, 
these areas of the law develop at a more rapid pace and receive more public 
exposure.  This can easily be seen in the often shocked response of the general 
public when offences against the basic rights of marginalised members of society are 
eventually brought to the fore.7   
 
Responsible organisations involved in the provision of legal aid to the poor should 
thus view the exposure of these large scale infringements on the rights of their 
clients as one of their primary functions.  It would not be altogether far-fetched to 
recognise that, at least in certain areas of law and / or jurisdictions, there exists a 
culture of disrespect for the rights of those who struggle to have access to proper 
legal representation.  One such area, which all law clinics have been faced with, is 
that of assisting judgment debtors who have fallen foul of disreputable and often 
immoral money lenders and other judgment creditors.  As is the case with the 
unemployed, the refugee and the evicted, debtors seldom have the financial means 
                                            
1 e.g. University of Cape Town Law Clinic. 
2 e.g. University of Johannesburg Law Clinic, Black Sash Paralegal Movement, Legal Resource 
Centre. 
3 e.g. University of the Witwatersrand Law Clinic, Social Law Project. 
4 e.g. University of the Western Cape Law Clinic, University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic, 
University of Kwazulu Natal Law Clinic, Rural Legal Trust. 
5 The situation is compounded by the fact that assistance to debtors is excluded in Chapter 3, page 
49 par 3.1 of the Legal Aid Board’s Legal Aid Guide.  
6 In practice these organisations and their clients for example do not have the means to afford 
advocates to represent them in Court or to prepare legal opinions, as is the case with private law 
firms. 
7 In South Africa the public were initially just as disbelieving and skeptic when the whole Saambou 
Bank scandal surfaced as many now are regarding the accusations surrounding the JD Group.  
http://www.bankgate.co.za/test/news.htm (accessed on 26 June 2008). 
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to afford the services of powerful private attorneys to protect their rights.  As a result 
it is crucial that these persons are properly assisted by the clinical law movement. 
 
 
2. Injustice, what injustice? 
 
Bad debt means big business in South Africa.  In the first quarter of 2007 alone, 
60 826 judgments for debt with a total value of R519,8 million were granted by our 
courts.  A staggering 121 986 summonses were issued for debt during this short 
period. 8  Anyone who has spent some time working in a legal aid (law) clinic or 
similar institution should be fairly well acquainted with the following scenario:9 
 
A client, whom we shall call Mr Nopay, walks into the clinic and complains that he is 
being overcharged for some debt which he has incurred.  He is specifically aggrieved 
because he has already repaid the amount of the initial debt and a substantial 
amount more.  In many cases this debt has also been formalised by way of court 
judgment entered against him.  Often these judgments are then followed by court 
orders arranging for monthly deductions from either his bank account or by way of 
garnishee order direct from his salary. 
 
Getting to the bottom of Mr Nopay’s complaint usually requires making a couple of 
telephone calls as well as the perusal of the contract underlying the debt, where 
same has been provided to him.  By making these enquiries and some elementary 
mathematical calculations it is possible to establish what the initial capital amount 
and total repayments to date have been.  Determining the total legal amount due and 
payable could however be considerably more painstaking, as it is necessary to 
establish applicable legal costs and interest rates.  This is usually no easy task, as it 
could be dependent on the application and implementation of various acts and 
common law principles,10 not to mention complicated interest and accountancy 
calculations. 
 
In many cases it will be found that Mr Nopay’s complaints can be attributed to his 
own ignorance or to that of his employer.  Employers will occasionally only deduct 
the judgment amount from the debtor’s salary, without taking interest and legal costs 
into consideration.  It is also possible that Mr Nopay has simply miscalculated his 
own repayments to the creditor.   
 
The following actual case studies of matters handled by the Legal Aid Clinic of the 
University of Stellenbosch however goes to show that there are cases where there 
exist merits in the complaints of Mr Nopay and other debtors. 
 
2.1 Checkers employees – Kuilsriver Court  
 
                                            
8 http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statskeyfindings.asp?PPN=P0041&SCH=3918 (accessed on 
18 June 2007). 
9 In an informal questionnaire sent to six University Law Clinics in South Africa (Witwatersrand, North 
West: Mmbatho, North West: Potchefstroom, Rhodes, Stellenbosch and Pretoria) on 25 May 
2007all participants indicated that they received complaints in this regard.   
10 For example the in duplum rule, which has now been given statutory authority in the National Credit 
Act 34/2005. 
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During 2001 the clinic was approached by 6 employees of Checkers, Brackenfell, a 
big chain store in South Africa.  They informed that they had been approached at 
work by two agents who offered them immediate cash in exchange for signing 
various contracts and blank documents.  They were not informed of the content of 
the documents and were schooled on average only to the 8th grade.  They were only 
told that they would have to pay back twice the amount that they borrowed. 
 
Amounts of between R500 and R800 were handed to each person.  They were 
supposed to repay the amounts to the agents personally, who were to collect same.  
This did not happen and the debtors were not provided with any documentation to 
indicate where or how alternative payments were to be made.   
 
By the time they approached the clinic it had transpired that two separate judgments 
had been taken against each of them based on the same loan.  Amounts ranging 
from R4487 to R7360 had already been deducted from each of their salaries (of 
R2100 per month) through two garnishee orders amounting to between R710 and 
R900 per month.  When the creditor was initially approached on the matter he 
indicated that amounts of approximately R3200 were still due and payable on each 
account.   
 
2.2 Berco employees – Bloemfontein Court 
 
During 2004 the clinic was approached by 10 employees of Berco cleaning services.  
Their monthly salaries were approximately R1400 per month.  It transpired that they 
were all approached during their 45 minute lunch breaks by an agent offering cash 
loans and were induced to sign contracts in a language which wasn’t familiar to 
them.  Again these persons had very little schooling and educational training. 
 
Amounts of between R820 and R1820 were paid to each person.  Garnishee orders 
were then issued from the Bloemfontein court, where the creditor resided, even 
though the debtors were employed in Stellenbosch.11  Amounts ranging from R4000 
to R7000 were already garnished against the salaries of each of these persons when 
they sought legal aid. 
 
Investigation of the matters revealed that the balance of the debt increased 
dramatically from month to month not withstanding the garnishee deductions.  In one 
of the debtors, Mrs C’s, case her initial loan was R1300 in 2002.  By March 2003 a 
garnishee order of R212 per month was implemented and the creditor informed the 
employer that the amount of the total debt was R4251.  By January 2004 11 monthly 
instalments amounting to R2338 had been deducted from Mrs C’s salary.  At this 
stage the creditor indicated that the amount still due was R7953.  By July 2004 a 
further R1062 had been paid over to the creditor, who informed that the balance was 
now R8391!     
 
2.3 Mr K and Ms A – Bellville Court 
 
                                            
11 According to section 65A(1) of the Magistrate’s Court Act 32/1944, an emoluments attachment 
order can only be issued by the court where the employer of the debtor carries on his business.  
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Ms A also fell in the trap of borrowing money from an unscrupulous money lender.  
Even though she was employed in Stellenbosch a garnishee order was issued 
against her by Bellville court.  This happened after the office where she was making 
weekly payments closed down without providing her forwarding details to facilitate 
further payments.  She borrowed an amount of R850 and paid over approximately 
R3000 before seeking legal assistance. 
 
Mr K borrowed an amount of R2900 when he was approached by 4 agents at his 
place of employment in Stellenbosch.  Later two separate garnishee orders were 
issued against him for this same cause of action by the Stellenbosch and Bellville 
courts. 
 
In all of above discussed matters garnishee orders were issued by the Clerk of the 
court.  These orders were rife with various amendments made in pen, and it was 
impossible to say whether these amendments were made before or after the order 
was granted.  In at least one instance an amendment to the total judgment (debt) 
was proven to be made unilaterally by the creditor after the order was obtained.  
Many of the orders were issued from the wrong court, where the creditor abused the 
tactical advantage of going to a court practically inaccessible to the debtor. 
 
Except for the above matters handled by the Stellenbosch Clinic, reports of other 
similar matters abound.  One such report alleges that a lady borrowed an amount of 
R5 000 from a reputable financial institution, and already repaid nearly R20 000 on 
this loan.  This institution alleges that she still owes a further R35 130,31 before her 
debt can be settled.  In the same report a spokesperson for the relevant financial 
institution, when confronted with this situation, admitted that “we do around 10 000 
new transactions every month and it is unavoidable that things might go wrong in the 
odd instances”.12 
 
Recently a prominent furniture company has been exposed on national television for 
the way in which it conducts its hire purchase transactions.13  Although the matter is 
still sub judice, it seams fairly clear that the company endorsed a policy of informing 
their clients that they entered into hire purchase agreements, with limited interest 
charges,14 when they were in fact signing for loan agreements at much higher 
interest rates.15  Their collection costs have also been questioned as it has been 
shown on their own bills of account that they charge illegal fees.  It is further alleged 
that in certain instances more than one garnishee order has been issued for the 
same debt.  Even more alarming is the allegations, as substantiated by the relevant 
company’s own policy documents, that when a debtor’s account goes into credit with 
the company, these amounts are simply transferred to an unclaimed balances 
account where they are eventually written off.16 
 
                                            
12 Article in “Die Kaapse Son” 8 June 2007: 2. 
13 Televised broadcast of Carte Blanche on the JD Group – 25 March and 20 May 2007. 
14 Around 20 percent.  http://www.carteblanche.co.za/Display/Display.asp?Id=3316 (accessed on 22     
June 2007). 
15 Charged at 32,5 percent.  http://www.carteblanche.co.za. 
16 http://www.carteblanche.co.za. 
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Mr Clark Gardner of Summit Financial Partners17 audited 70 000 of the 1,75 million 
garnishee orders that have been set in motion by South African Courts.18  According 
to him the system is riddled with abuse.  “If we had to extrapolate our audit findings 
there must be over a billion rand being over-deducted from already distressed 
borrowers and going into the pockets of unscrupulous lenders and collectors alike.”19  
 
From the above summation it is clear that some creditors unilaterally charge 
exuberant and unlawful fees for interest and ‘legal’ costs, which amounts are simply 
added to the judgments, sometimes even ex post facto.  The sum total then being 
that debtors are charged to pay illegal amounts of money as repayment of their 
debts.  One does not need to think too long to imagine the negative impact this has 
on the lives of debtors who are burdened with these payments; the negative cycle of 
indebtedness and the resulting big business lives on.  
 
 
3. But how can this be possible? 
 
A loathsome and regrettable combination of factors gives rise to this situation. 
 
The average debtor in South Africa lacks the necessary numeracy-, literacy- and 
legal skills to make judgment calls on complicated legislation and calculations.  The 
calculation of the total legal amount due and payable by a debtor, especially in the 
case of cash loans, is often quite complicated.  These calculations are made 
unilaterally by the creditor, who simply provides the debtor with the total amount due.  
Upon being (often repeatedly) requested to provide a detailed account, creditors will 
in all likelihood produce a complicated statement spanning several pages and just 
conveying enough information to put the debtor further in the dark.   
 
Creditors further empower themselves by including, in most credit agreements, a 
clause in which the debtor agrees that a statement or certificate signed by the 
appropriate officer of the creditor constitutes sufficient proof of both the debtor’s 
default and the exact amount thereof.  When entering default judgments against 
debtors this certificate also serves to get the Clerk of the court, responsible to 
rubberstamp the judgment, off the hook.20  She can now rely on this and is not 
required to calculate whether the amount entered as judgment is correct.  Even 
where no certificate is produced the Clerk of the court can not be expected to 
engage in mental gymnastics in each request for default judgment brought before 
her.  The court thus relies on the bona fides of the judgment creditor in a system 
where the Clerk of the court is already heavily overburdened with responsibilities. 
 
The heavy workload placed on the average Clerk of the court cannot however 
excuse him from blatant ignorance as to the rules of the court regarding jurisdiction.  
As shown in the examples dealt with above,21 it quite often happens that judgments 
                                            
17 http://www.summitfin.co.za/ (accessed on 22 June 2007). 
18 In the informal questionnaire Rhodes University indicated that 60 percent of their grades 1 – 5 staff 
members have emoluments attachment orders against their salaries. 
19 http://www.carteblanche.co.za/Display/Display.asp?Id=3316 (accessed on 22 June 2007). 
20 It is general knowledge that the vast majority of default judgments are granted by the Clerk of the 
court in terms of rule 12 of the Magistrate’s Court Act. 
21 See paragraph 2. 
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and emoluments attachment orders are granted by Clerks of courts who have no 
jurisdiction over the matter.  The lack of accountancy and numeracy skills on the part 
of many civil officers are thus compounded by their frequent lack in basic legal 
knowledge.    
 
The court’s reliance on the creditor’s bona fides gets even more serious after the 
judgment has been awarded.  It is practically impossible for the court to keep abreast 
of each debtor’s payments and reducing balances in respect of the judgments 
entered under its jurisdiction.  Understandably, the issue of discharge then becomes 
hugely problematic as the courts do not mero motu step in to cancel judgments and 
the resulting emoluments attachment orders and other tools of collection employed 
by these creditors. 
 
It can be argued that the lack of accountancy and numeracy skills present in debtors 
and court officials are not necessarily absent from creditors either.  Judging by the 
number and frequency of accounts being overcharged, it seems that creditors are 
however inclined to rather err on the side of charging too much when they 
themselves seem to be unsure as to whether a certain debt has been discharged.  
This situation is compounded when a debt is handed over to attorneys or debt 
collectors, who often add their own fees and costs illegally to that already charged by 
the creditor.22  It also stands to argue that many creditors may justify this 
overcharging of debtors who are able to pay, because they have attachable assets 
or a salary which can be executed against, by balancing this with their bad debt 
book.     
   
Against this background it might not be surprising that many creditors are more than 
willing to play the percentages in a society where illiteracy and a lack of basic 
numeracy skills abound.  Combined with the limited access to proficient legal aid, 
debtors are seldom informed enough to lodge their complaints in a manner as to 
force the creditor and courts to properly attend to it.     
 
 
4. Assisting the overcharged debtor  
 
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that our Mr Nopay has in fact been 
overcharged in the calculation of his debt.  He has already paid the considerable 
amount of R3000 more than he was legally obliged to do.23  He now looks to the 
specific legal aid institution to assist him in not only stopping the creditor from 
deducting monthly payments from his bank or salary, but also to reverse payment of 
the overcharged amount. 
 
Typically the clinic would now approach the creditor with the recalculation of the 
debt.  It will be found in many cases that the creditor will be interested in negotiating 
                                            
22 Most Law Societies allow for a collection commission of only 10 percent.  Creditors however often 
add the full amount in terms of their own arrangements with their collection agencies to the debtor’s 
account. 
23 This information would be available to the Clinic after having received the basic details of the 
transaction and repayments and having conducted its own investigations and calculations or after 
having made use of the services of an expert.  
 8
a settlement with the debtor, especially if he is able to clean the slate and avoid the 
risk of a counterclaim for the overcharged amount.   
 
The new National Credit Act24 should also play a considerable part in regulating 
these types of discussions in the future.  In terms of this act, which aims to protect 
over-indebted consumers, the creditor can be forced to enter into talks with a debt 
counsellor acting on behalf of the debtor before he approaches a court.25  
Subsequent renegotiations of the total debt or instalment payments are also 
facilitated.26  Where judgment has however already been entered against the debtor 
the Act does not seem to play much of a role.27 
 
Should no judgment have been entered against Mr Nopay he would be advised to 
simply cease payment and to close his bank account, where deductions were being 
made from, if necessary and should the creditor be unwilling to cooperate and initiate 
the stop-order on his own.  If the creditor then starts legal proceedings against Mr 
Nopay said action can be defended and the appropriate counterclaim, based on the 
condictio indebiti,28 filed.  Negotiations and / or legal summons can also be pursued 
against the creditor to repay the amount of R3000.  
 
A claim for the repayment of interest illegally charged by a credit provider was 
recently brought before the court in the matter of Mndi v Malgas.29  In this case the 
debtor relied on enrichment to recover excess usurious interest that she paid to the 
creditor.  The lender agreed to lend the borrower an amount of R6000 at an interest 
rate of 30 percent per month, on which loan the debtor eventually paid back an 
amount of R34692,60.  The court granted the debtor’s claim in the amount of 
R26772,60, being the difference between the interest paid at the agreed rate and the 
interest payable at the legal rate of 15 percent per anum.  
 
Judgments against debtors subjugated to the collection process are in practice 
mostly found to be entered by default.30  The reason for this is that these debts are 
typically a result of money lending, hire purchase of goods or services or other credit 
providing activities.  Before these agreements are entered into creditors normally 
have their clients sign lengthy documentation, providing inter alia for consent to 
default judgments and garnishee orders, in order to simplify and hasten the 
collection process for the creditor and his collection agents.31   
 
If default judgment was entered against Mr Nopay and the creditor is amenable to 
settle the matter, he would simply agree to the rescission of the judgment in terms of 
rule 49(5) of the Magistrate’s Court Act, which reads as follows: 
 
                                            
24 Act 34/2005. 
25 sec 88(3), 129. 
26 sec 86. 
27 sec 86(2). 
28 Harms, Amler’s Precedents of Pleadings 4th ed: 68 
29 2006(6) SA 182 (E). 
30 Chapter 8 of the Magistrate’s Court Act allows in sec 57 and 58 for a shorter method to collect 
outstanding debt, widely used by credit providers, debt collectors and attorneys alike. 
31 The minority of cases where judgment is entered by means other than by default is regulated by 
sec 36 and rule 49(7) and (8) of the Magistrate’s Court Act and falls outside the scope of this 
article. 
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“Where a plaintiff in whose favour a default judgment was granted has agreed in 
writing that the judgment be rescinded or varied, either the plaintiff or the defendant 
against whom the judgment was granted may, by notice to all parties to the 
proceedings, request the court to rescind or vary the default judgment, which request 
shall be accompanied by written proof of the plaintiff's consent to the rescission or 
variation.” 
 
After the order has been granted it will then be brought to the attention of Mr Nopay’s 
employer who will cease the deductions from his salary where an emoluments 
attachment order has been issued.  Similarly any pending legal execution against Mr 
Nopay’s property will also be set aside.  Again it is now possible to consider the 
option of initiating action to reclaim the overpaid amount. 
 
The scenario where default judgment was entered against Mr Nopay and where the 
judgment creditor is unwilling to accede to the request to rescind the judgment is 
however considerably more problematic.  It is in this regard specifically that this 
article argues that the South African legal system, including relevant legislation, 
lends insufficient protection and recourse to indigent legal aid clients faced with 
questionable collection methods and calculations of unscrupulous creditors.    
 
Opposed rescission of default judgment applications in Magistrate’s courts,32 same 
being creatures of statute, are ordained by section 36 and in practice regulated by 
rule 49(1) and (3) of the Act.  The relevant rules specify the following: 
 
“49 Rescission and variation of judgments 
 
(1)  A party to proceedings in which a default judgment has been given, or any 
person affected by such judgment, may within 20 days after obtaining 
knowledge of the judgment serve and file an application to court, on notice to 
all parties to the proceedings, for a rescission or variation of the judgment and 
the court may, upon good cause shown, or if it is satisfied that there is good 
reason to do so, rescind or vary the default judgment on such terms as it 
deems fit.   
(3)  Where an application for rescission of a default judgment is made by a 
defendant against whom the judgment was granted, who wishes to defend the 
proceedings, the application must be supported by an affidavit setting out the 
reasons for the defendant's absence or default and the grounds of the 
defendant's defence to the claim.” 
 
From the wording of the Act it is clear that the court will only entertain applications for 
the rescission of judgments taken by default where there are merits in such an 
application and where the application is brought before the court within 20 days after 
obtaining knowledge of the judgment.33   
 
This last restriction is highly problematic in the situation at hand.  It will often happen, 
as was the case in the case-studies presented above,34 that the debtor has 
                                            
32 In other words where the debtor wants to defend the action against him. 
33 rule 49(1).  A similar restriction is placed on applications for the rescission of High Court judgments 
in rule 31(2)(b) of the High Court Act 59/1959.   
34 See par 2. 
 10
knowledge of the judgment against him well in advance of his objection to the 
continued enforcement thereof.  A person can easily fall upon hard times and be 
unable to repay his agreed monthly payment for a period of time.  As has been 
shown in the case-studies shrewd money lenders can also manipulate the system to 
make it impossible for debtors to repay the agreed instalments.  The debtor realises 
that judgment has been entered against him when he is informed of this by his 
employer, who deducts amounts from his salary in accordance with the emoluments 
attachment order.  Initially the debtor reluctantly agrees to this measure, as he 
realises that he does owe an amount to the creditor.   
 
When, after several months or years of substantial payments, the outstanding 
balance according to the creditor still increases with every instalment paid, the 
debtor develops an issue with the current existence, justification and enforceability of 
the judgment.  Should the creditor refuse to grant his consent in terms of rule 49(5) 
the debtor is now, maybe years after the initial judgment came to his knowledge, 
barred from attacking the illegally enforced judgment by the provisions of rule 49(1).   
 
Mr Nopay’s only salvation might lie in the provisions of rule 60(5) of the Magistrate’s 
Court Act, which reads as follows: 
 
“[A]ny time limit prescribed by these rules … may at any time, whether before or after 
the expiry of the period limited, be extended- 
 (a) by the written consent of the opposite party; and 
(b) if such consent is refused, then by the court on application and on such 
terms as to costs and otherwise as may be just.” 
 
Rule 60(5) grants the court a discretion that has to be exercised judicially.  The rule 
does not prescribe exactly how this discretion is to be exercised, but it seems that 
the court has a wide discretion in this regard.  It is important that the purpose of the 
rule is kept in mind, as was explained in the case of Evander Caterers (Pty) Ltd v 
Potgieter35 as follows: 
 
“Generally speaking, a time limit in the rules of court is directed at a delay in the 
particular procedural step.  It is not concerned with the merits of the case as such, 
and, because of the existence of the sub-rule under consideration, it is not intended 
without more to deprive a litigant of his claim or defence, as the case may be.  It is 
merely intended to prevent delay or an injustice being done owing to delay.  It would 
seem to follow that an extension of a time limit should not be granted as a matter of 
course, merely for the asking, and it should also not be lightly refused if the delay did 
not prejudice the other party in respect of the merits or in the conduct of his case, 
other than the procedural advantage gained by him owing to the existence of the 
time limit.  Indeed everything should be done to secure a fair trail between the 
parties in the litigation so that the disputes and questions may be settled on their 
merits.” 
 
The principle seems reasonable enough, and assuming that the uncooperative 
creditor will not consent in terms of sub-clause (a), the court should be able to 
encourage fairness through the application of sub-clause (b).  Returning to the case 
                                            
35 1972 (3) SA 312 (T). 
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studies dealt with by the Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic, the danger and 
inconsistencies of trusting this duty to the discretion of the court can however be 
clearly illustrated: 
 
When faced with an application under rule 60(5) the Bloemfontein court in the Berco 
matters decided that the fact that the applicants were initially, though reluctantly, ad 
idem with the judgment and that they only much later indicated that they were now 
no longer so, proved insufficient cause for it to grant condonation.  This opinion was 
shared by the Bellville court in the matters of Mr K and Ms A, where the learned 
magistrate was of the opinion that the explanation of the applicant failed to convince 
the court that there existed “good cause”.  A different interpretation was followed by 
the magistrate of the Kuilsriver court in the Checkers matters, where he agreed that 
the change of circumstances surrounding the judgment and the applicant’s lack of 
legal prowess was sufficient grounds for the court to exercise it’s discretion in the 
applicant’s favour.  The strict interpretation of the first two courts is apparently also 
not favoured by the magistrate of the Mafikeng court, who “fortunately takes quite a 
lenient view when it comes to legal aid clients, especially if these clients approached 
us late due to their ignorance.”36 
 
It would thus seem that the success of an application in terms of rule 60(5) is by no 
means guaranteed.  This makes an application for rescission of judgment in terms of 
rule 49(1) a risky proposition in the circumstances in which Mr Nopay and thousands 
of other debtors find themselves in.   
 
Should it be impossible to rescind the judgment itself as a result of the 20 day limit of 
rule 49(1) and a restrictive interpretation of rule 60(5), as was the attitude of the 
Bloemfontein and Bellville courts, the only further option is to deal with the symptoms 
of the judgment.  By this is meant specifically to tackle the garnishee order issued 
against Mr Nopay’s salary.37  Section 65J(7) of the Magistrate’s Court Act provides 
for the relevant application: 
 
“Any emoluments attachment order may at any time on good cause shown be 
suspended, amended or rescinded by the court, and when suspending any such 
order the court may impose such conditions as it may deem just and reasonable.” 
 
A very noteworthy exclusion from the content of the above section is that of the 20 
day restriction prevalent in rule 49(1).  It is thus possible to attack the validity of the 
garnishee order, or at least decrease the amount garnished in terms thereof, without 
consideration as to the time already lapsed since the judgment came to the debtor’s 
attention.  As was the case in the Berco, Mr K and Ms A matters, these orders are 
and should be granted fairly easily on a court’s consideration of the facts of 
overpayment.   
 
The results are that the garnishee order is rescinded, and no more deductions are 
made from Mr Nopay’s salary.  The threat of the looming impenetrable judgment 
against him is however not in the least bit diminished.  Mr Nopay is still “black-listed” 
                                            
36 Results of above mentioned informal questionnaire. 
37 An application in terms of sec 73 of the Magistrate’s Court Act can also be lodged to attempt to 
force the creditor to accept installments instead of continuing with a sale in execution where the 
debtor’s assets have been attached. 
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as a debtor owing an amount of money established by unilateral fabrication by his 
creditor.  His creditor can now still issue a warrant of execution against his debtor’s 
property and also simply return to court with another application for the reinstatement 
of an emoluments attachment order.38 
 
A further practical problem which exists and which has been encountered in the       
case studies has been the ineffectiveness of the human resource departments of the 
employers of garnishee debtors.  In the Berco matter39 the emoluments attachment 
orders of 10 employees of a large cleaning company were set aside in terms of rule 
65J(7).  The relevant court orders, ordering the employer to cease deductions from 
the salaries, were faxed and hand delivered to the employer’s human resource 
department.  When the stop orders were not implemented in the following month, the 
relevant employer informed that he could not be held responsible for this as the 
resulting administration took more than a month to finalise.  Some months after the 
relevant orders were eventually administrated, debtors returned to the clinic with 
complaints that deductions had again been made from their salaries.  Upon further 
investigation it transpired that the creditor and / or his attorney had simply addressed 
a letter to the employer informing him that a certain amount was still outstanding on 
the debt and to continue subtracting the garnishee.  Human resources acted on 
these instructions, under the threat that the employer could be directly responsible 
for payment of these debts if he failed to pay on behalf of his employees.   
 
Although it is clear that the employer and the creditor acted negligently and / or 
dishonestly in these instances, reimbursing the debtor for these additional amounts 




5. Recommendations  
 
From the above discussion it is argued that current South African legislation provides 
insufficient protection and remedies to the debtor who wishes to challenge the 
validity of the continued existence of a judgment and the extent of the amount of the 
reducing (or increasing!) balance on his debt.  As in all instances when legislation 
fails to provide an answer, one might look to the common law to come to the rescue. 
 
The issue of whether there exists, at common law, a concept of rescission of 
judgment was dealt with in the matter of Bakhoven v Howes.40  In casu it was found 
that a judgment could well be rescinded in terms of the common law should there 
exist sufficient cause to do so.41  This case was however dealt with by the High 
court, where this court’s general jurisdiction allows it to take cognisance of the 
common law.  In the Magistrate’s courts it is now trite law that the grounds for 
rescission, as set out in section 36, are exhaustive.42  There is thus no real scope to 
                                            
38 This is done quite easily by requesting the issuing of a Certified Copy of Judgment from one court 
to be lodged at another and simply continue with the process in a court which would have no 
knowledge of the previous application in terms of sec 65J(7). 
39 See 2.2 above. 
40 1992 (2) SA 466 (E). 
41 At 468G. 
42 Erasmus, Jones & Buckle 8th ed: 142.  
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remedy the shortcomings of the statutory provisions in the Magistrate’s courts 
through application of the common law. 
 
A fairly obvious solution to addressing at least some of the concerns raised in this 
article would be to invest in better and proper training for court officers.  The Clerk of 
the court plays too important a role in the whole process of debt recovery and 
collections to be ignorant or ill-informed as to the basic rules of court, for example 
those pertaining to jurisdiction.   
 
With the signing into law of the new National Credit Act debtors in future should be 
protected from at least some of the deficiencies of the current system.  It is foreseen 
that the negotiation process provided for by section 129 and 130 of the Act will have 
to be followed by creditors before they are allowed to approach the court for a 
judgment.  A further consequence of the new legislation is that in all probability the 
Clerk of the court will in future have to refer all requests for default judgments based 
on credit agreements to the court.  She will therefore no longer be able to grant 
these without judicial inspection of the matter.43 
 
Although a thorough analysis of how this problem is dealt with by foreign jurisdictions 
falls outside the scope of this article, it is interesting to briefly examine the English 
and Australian positions with a view to the weight that foreign law might carry in this 
argument. 
 
In England the Civil Procedure Rules44 dictate that a court has a discretion to rescind 
a default judgment.45  One of the factors which the court must take into consideration 
in the exercise of its discretion is whether the application for rescission was brought 
“promptly”.46  If this has not been the case, the applicant should produce reasons for 
his tardiness.  The lapse of time before the application is brought to court is however 
only one of the factors to be taken into consideration.  In Citoma Trading Ltd v 
Brazil47 the court of appeals ruled that the lapse of time in itself should not deny the 
granting of a rescission of a default judgment. 
 
In Australia a similar approach is followed with regard to the absence of prescriptive 
timeframes for the filing of rescission applications.  Again this lapse of time is only 
one of the factors taken into consideration in determining whether the application 
would bring about some unreasonable prejudice to the creditor.48  It is argued that no 
such prejudice would exist in the instance under discussion, and that it would thus be 
possible for the court to grant the rescission order to the distressed debtor. 
 
Another solution might be found by looking closer to home at the procedures put in 
place to regulate the process for administration orders.49  This process is somewhat 
similar to that of collections by creditors, in so far as that a specified amount of the 
debtor’s monthly income is paid over to the court appointed administrator for 
                                            
43 Magistrate’s Court Act, rule 12(5). 
44 1998 (SI 1998/3132). 
45 rule 13.3. 
46 rule 13.3(2). 
47 [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 750, CA. 
48 http://www.cclcnsw.org.au (accessed on 27 June 2007). 
49 sec 74 of the Magistrate’s Court Act.  
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distribution to the debtor’s various creditors.  According to section 74J(1) and (5) of 
the Act the administrator is obliged to render a detailed account of the debtors 
affairs, which account has to be updated on a quarterly basis and must further be 
placed for inspection in the court file.  In this way it is possible for the debtor and any 
other interested parties to keep up to date with the reducing balances and also to 
query any suspicious costs added to the account.  It is argued that these accounts 
should then be audited or at least thoroughly verified on a regular basis.50 
 
A more drastic approach is however ultimately necessary to alleviate the situation 
and to discourage the large scale financial abuse of debtors so prevalent in this 
country.  It is argued that the relevant sections and rules of the Magistrate’s Court 
Act dealing with the rescission of judgments will have to be revisited with the view of 
providing relief and ensure justice and fairness to the interests of debtors and not 
only to those of creditors.   
 
The inclusion of a 20 day time restriction arguably makes sense in the normal run of 
the mill application for rescission where one may want to discourage debtors from 
further clogging the courts with applications brought long overdue.  It makes sense to 
require that a debtor acts within a reasonable time to combat the existence of a 
judgment that should never have been granted.  The rules as they are now however 
fail to cater for those matters where the judgment, which might have been proper to 





It would probably be impossible to ever measure the full social and economic impact 
of unlawful collections on the lives of debtors and their families.  Because of the 
stigma associated with debt, most people carry this burden with silent shame. Yet 
people find themselves in this situation not only due to their own irresponsibility, but 
due to a combination of factors. These factors often include aggressive advertising 
and marketing, reckless lending, a previously unregulated credit industry, lack of 
appropriate policies and laws associated with credit, historical disadvantages, a lack 
of consumer education and desperation to meet basic needs such as food and 
clothing.   
 
The cycle of bad debt drags these people under and adds to the moral and civil 
decay of our society.  We must not allow those who choose to make a living from the 
suffering of these marginalised members of society to longer go unhindered in their 
practices.  They should not be allowed to escape responsibility by cases being 
thrown out of court based on technical limitations in stead of being judged on their 
merits.  
 
The clinical movement and clinical legal education have an important role to play in 
support of this cause.  The availability of skilled professional staff who assist 
students in tackling these cases is crucial.  In assisting persons like Mr Nopay the 
student consultant is also gaining valuable experience in basic legal skills such as 
consulting, negotiating, drafting and engaging in legal research. 
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